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This study shows that during Paul Volcker’s drastic monetary 
tightening in the early 1980s, local banks operating in only one 
county reduced loan supply much more sharply than local subsidiaries 
of multi-county bank holding companies in similar markets, after 
controlling for bank (and holding company) size, liquidity, capital 
conditions, and, most important, local credit demand. The study 
allows cleaner identification by examining 18 U.S. “county-banking 
states” where a bank’s local lending volume at the county level was 
observable because no one was allowed to branch across county 
borders. The local nature of lending allows us to approximate and 
control for the exogenous component of local loan demand using the 
prediction that counties with a higher share of manufacturing 
employment exhibit weaker loan demand during tightening (which is 
consistent with the interest rate channel and the balance-sheet channel 
of monetary policy transmission).The study sheds light on the 
working of the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. 
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On October 6, 1979, the newly appointed Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul Volcker, 
drastically escalated the Fed’s anti-inflation efforts, and the monetary tightening cycle entered a 
new phase (see Walsh, 2004, for a review of the history). In the next two years, by targeting 
nonborrowed bank reserves, the Fed allowed nominal interest rates to climb at some point to over 
20 percent per annum. Two back-to-back policy-induced recessions followed, in particular in the 
manufacturing-intensive “rust belt” areas. The American banking sector at that time was 
fragmented geographically, with numerous small local community banks populating the country. 
Facing tighter monetary conditions, many banks had to cut back on lending, which could further 
exacerbate the downturn of the local economy they were serving. This feedback mechanism is 
referred to as the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission (Kashyap and Stein, 
2000).   
Regarding the effect of Volcker’s monetary tightening on bank lending, we notice that 
local community banks seemed be affected much more than those banks whose operations were 
not restricted to a single U.S. county. How much did the geographic isolation of local community 
banks contribute to the credit crunch? Would things have evolved differently if the banks had 
been operating across county and state borders at that time? The answers to these questions can 
help us better understand the working of the bank lending channel of monetary policy 
transmission and how banking market consolidation may change it. 
This drastic and unprecedented monetary tightening, totally unexpected, and unseen for a 
second time so far, provided an interesting “experiment” for us to study how the geographic 
isolation of local community banks affects the sensitivity of loan supply to monetary policy, 
because it was unlikely that some banks foresaw this sudden policy change and made a choice to 
expand geographically in advance. An important empirical innovation of this study is to draw 
evidence from some special “county-banking states” existing at that time (which accounted for 
  - 1 -one-third of U.S. gross domestic product). In these U.S. states, because of certain banking 
regulations (that phased out in the late 1980s), no banks were allowed to set up branches outside 
their home counties, but bank holding companies were allowed to own local subsidiaries in 
multiple counties. Uniquely, local lending data at the county level were available for a multi-
county holding company as well because it was not allowed to consolidate its subsidiary 
operations into one entity. Exploiting (1) this special regulatory setting and (2) the drastic 
monetary tightening event, and (3) noting that neither of these two interesting conditions can be 
found in a more recent period, this study examines whether single-county local banks reacted any 
differently to the common monetary conditions, (1) versus nonlocal banks (i.e., local subsidiaries 
of the multi-county bank holding companies) (2) versus banks operating in similar markets, and 
(3) other things being equal (for example, various measures of bank size, liquidity conditions, 
local credit demand, etc.).  
Local banks are more likely to be influenced strongly by local market conditions, relative 
to the bank holding companies that diversify their operations geographically.
1 In the 1980s 
geographic expansion could be thought of as a financial innovation that allowed banks to hedge 
and insure against risks across regions. Within a holding company, subsidiaries operating in 
different geographic markets can provide mutual insurance to each other, because it is convenient 
for the holding company to move loanable funds across subsidiaries to support those relatively 
short of liquidity (Holod and Peek, 2006).
 Other things being equal, subsidiaries of multi-county 
bank holding companies could be considered financially stronger than stand-alone local banks 
(Houston, James and Marcus, 1997; Houston and James, 1998; Campello, 2002; Ashcraft, 2003). 
                                                 
1 Chionsini, Foglia, and Reedtz (2003), using confidential Italian data, find that diversification of loan 
portfolios across sectors or geographic regions reduces credit risks (unexpected credit losses in a value-at-
risk model) because of the diversification of idiosyncratic risks. Ogden, Rangan, and Stanley (1989) find 
that geographic diversification can reduce a mortgage portfolio’s foreclosure-risk exposure by 50% to 90%, 
when compared to geographically undiversified ones. Corgel and Gay (1987) show similar results. Using 
Italian data, Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2002) provide evidence that geographical diversification of 
loan portfolios results in an improvement in the risk-return trade-off but only for banks with low levels of 
risk. 
  - 2 -Indeed, Hankins (2006) shows that bank mergers are motivated by the opportunity for operational 
hedging across regions.  
  To understand how geographic diversification affects banks, we need to note that a 
national monetary policy, through the interest-rate channel and the balance-sheet channel, can 
have an asymmetric impact on different geographic areas (Carlino and DeFina, 1998, Peersman 
and Smets, 2005, both provide evidence). Some areas are more heavily affected than others. A 
banking organization that operates in multiple local economies may face very different loan 
demand, loan performance, and liquidity situations, in each local market, subject to local 
borrower conditions (see Ashcraft and Campello, 2007, for evidence). The manufacturing sector’s 
demand for credit is more pro-cyclical because the demand for durable manufactured goods is 
pro-cyclical. Being more capital-intensive, the manufacturing sector also naturally desires less 
investment when interest rates are high. Higher interest rates also increase debt service, erode 
cash flows, depress collateral values, and thus reduce the creditworthiness of borrowers and 
increase the external finance premium. All loans — industrial, consumer, and real estate — are 
affected. Industrial towns are  more strongly affected by monetary tightening, not only through its 
direct impact on manufacturing companies, but also through its indirect effect on local individuals 
and real estate properties, whose creditworthiness and collateral values are compromised because 
of slower income and employment growth in the local economy of these industrial towns.  
Note that both loan supply and demand are affected by the monetary tightening and the 
local market conditions. Banks located in recession areas may lose capital, may face greater 
liquidity risks, and may have to reduce loan supply (i.e., the bank lending channel); in the 
meantime, local borrowers may demand less credit (i.e., the balance-sheet channel). Theoretically, 
the ability to move funds across geographic borders can both dampen and exacerbate the effects 
of monetary policy, with the net effect depending mainly on how the supply of loans (by the 
banking sector) and the demand for loans (by the real sector), respectively, react to monetary 
policy (Morgan, Rime, and Strahan, 2004), or in other words, whether the bank lending channel 
  - 3 -or the balance-sheet channel dominates. 
On the supply side, the bank holding companies, with more diversified geographic 
exposure, may be able to help their local subsidiaries smooth out the effects of monetary shocks 
by moving loanable funds through their internal markets to where credit is most needed but in 
short supply. When return on capital is higher in recession regions (because local banks facing 
capital and liquidity problems reduce the supply of credit), geographically diversified banks, in 
pursuit of higher profit, can and are willing to pick up the lending slack and dampen local lending 
volatility. Ashcraft (2006), for example, finds that aggregate lending’s response to monetary 
policy is weaker in states where bank holding companies control more market shares than do 
stand-alone banks. Stand-alone local banks, however, because of their lack of external sources of 
funding, may have to reduce support to local borrowers. Becker (2007), for example, shows that 
local loan supply is determined mostly by local deposits, and this correlation is stronger in 
markets where banks are small and where intrastate branching is restricted.  
  On the other hand, the opportunity for geographic diversification is also capable of 
exacerbating volatility. A multi-county holding company, because of its diverse geographic 
presence, may move loanable funds among its subsidiaries in pursuit of maximized returns on 
capital. A typical two-region real business cycle (RBC) model (e.g., Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 
1995) will suggest that when a region receives a negative shock in the real sector, the return of 
bank lending declines (for both local and nonlocal banks), and with capital mobility, investment 
will tend to flow out of the region. After a contractionary monetary shock, multi-county bank 
holding companies may swiftly move loanable funds away from counties experiencing deeper 
recessions (if this is associated with lower returns to capital and more collateral damage) into 
counties in relatively better shape.
2  More specifically, they may move funds away from 
manufacturing-intensive local markets to more service-oriented counties, since the former is more 
                                                 
2 Lang and Nakamura (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) both show that there is a flight to 
quality after tightening of monetary policy, as banks allocate more credit to firms with fewer problems of 
asymmetric information. 
  - 4 -affected by the national monetary tightening. A local bank, however, has to stay with its 
customers through good times and bad regardless of their balance-sheet conditions (Strahan, 
2006), which may dampen the shocks, particularly when the bank is located in a recession region.  
  Despite the strong policy interests (cf. Group of Ten (2001) and English (2002)) in 
understanding how geographic diversification (and isolation for that matter) and banking sector 
consolidation affect the transmission of monetary policy — in particular, the bank lending 
channel, i.e., how monetary policy affects bank loan supply — rigorous empirical evidence is 
hard to come by because of the lack of disaggregated micro data.
 
This paper’s contribution is mainly empirical. Previous studies usually could not observe 
local lending volumes by individual banks. However, in the county-banking states examined in 
this study — where the only form of geographic expansion is through holding company 
subsidiaries —we luckily have both of the necessary elements for micro-research: (a) the 
coexistence of local and nonlocal banks (i.e., subsidiaries of multi-county bank holding 
companies) in the same local markets very narrowly defined at the county level, and (b) the 
availability of local lending data because of the restrictions on formal branching across county 
borders.  
Also, in county-banking states, the restrictions on cross-county branching had imposed an 
upper cap on the potential size of banks and bank subsidiaries operating there, since the potential 
market size is fixed. In Kashyap and Stein’s (2000) samples, however, “small banks” may stay 
small for some unobservable reasons that are difficult to control for (e.g., as the authors point out, 
bank owners with lower risk aversion prefer running a smaller but entrepreneurial organization 
and lending to more cyclical and risky borrowers). 
Our study is similar to Campello’s (2002) in that we both use bank holding company 
affiliation status to distinguish two groups of banks. However, the local nature of lending in 
  - 5 -county-banking states helps us better disentangle the influence of loan supply and demand.
3 
Ashcraft and Campello (2007), by comparing lending of subsidiaries belonging to the same bank 
holding company but operating in different states (a much broader geographic unit than a 
county
4), show that local demand factors affect lending independent of the bank lending channel. 
We adopt a similar, but more refined approach. Because of the special regulatory requirements, 
we know that in the county-banking states, loans recorded under a bank (subsidiary) are mostly 
made to borrowers in the same county where the bank is headquartered.  Then the exogenous 
component of the local credit demand can be reasonably inferred and approximated by the 
interaction between county-level industrial structure and national monetary policy conditions, 
because the interest-rate channel and the balance-sheet channel of monetary policy transmission 
predicts that counties with a high share of manufacturing would exhibit more pro-cyclical credit 
demand when facing the same national monetary policy.  
Furthermore, the difference of the borrower bases across local and nonlocal banks is 
unlikely to drive our results. In county-banking states, local subsidiaries of multi-county holding 
companies are unlikely to differ much from stand-alone local banks in business model, 
organization, and philosophy, because the local subsidiaries are managed relatively independently 
and soft information can be actively used in evaluating loan applications, as is the case in stand-
alone local banks (cf. Whalen, 1982; Blackwell, Brickley, and Weisbach, 1994). Also, Ashcraft 
(2006), based on data available since 1993, shows that the size mix of borrowers does not differ 
significantly across stand-alone banks and bank holding company affiliates.  
To summarize, this empirical study separates banks into two groups: the “local banks” 
                                                 
3 Researchers usually study credit channels (either lending or balance-sheet channels) using the data of 
banks and firms separately because of the difficulty in matching the two sets of data. For the bank lending 
(narrow credit) channel, Kashyap and Stein (2000) study banks and show that less liquid banks reduce 
lending when the Fed tightens money. For the balance-sheet (broad credit) channel, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1993, 1994) find that small firms and more leveraged firms shed inventory and redundant labor during 
tight money periods, whereas such effects are not found in boom times or in large firms with access to the 
bond market. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) provide a good review of the literature on the credit channel of 
monetary policy transmission.  
4 According to Forni and Reichlin (1997), county factors explain 31.3% of output fluctuations in the U.S., 
more important than state factors (23.2%). 
  - 6 -that limit their operations to only one county, and the “nonlocal banks” that are subsidiaries of 
holding companies that operate in multiple counties. Both groups of banks operate in the same 
local county markets. The study then shows that during Paul Volcker’s monetary tightening in the 
early 1980s, local banks’ lending responded much more strongly than that of nonlocal banks, 
after controlling for size, liquidity, capital, and most important, local credit demand. Such a result 
suggests that a multi-bank holding company operating across county borders may be able to help 
smooth out the impact of monetary policy tightening within its internal capital market and allow 
those subsidiaries experiencing liquidity problems to shrink loan volumes less sharply than stand-
alone local banks experiencing similar problems.  
Importantly, the local nature of lending in “county-banking states” allows us to 
approximate exogenous local loan demand using the prediction that counties with a higher share 
of manufacturing employment indeed demand less credit during tightening when these industrial 
towns are in worse shape (which is consistent with the prediction of the interest-rate channel and 
the balance-sheet channel of monetary policy transmission). Finally, the study also finds that the 
disadvantage of local banks was smaller in counties that employed more manufacturing workers, 
because of the more pro-cyclical local loan demand in these places. Therefore, a poor supply of 
credit as a result of a bank’s geographic isolation mattered less in the more manufacturing-
oriented counties during monetary tightening.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the study’s empirical 
methodology: how county-banking states are identified and why it is important, how local banks 
are defined, and how the regressions are specified. We spend significantly more time in this 
section because this study’s contribution lies in its unique empirical design that exploits some 
special regulatory settings. Section 3 discusses the regression results, how we control for local 
credit demand, bank size, bank liquidity, and capital conditions, etc. Section 4 concludes the 
paper with a brief discussion of policy implications.  
 
  - 7 -2. Empirical Methodology 
2.1. County-Banking States and Local Banks 
The breakdown of a bank’s lending volume by borrowers or by local geographic units, 
such as a county, is usually not disclosed to the public. In the United States, lending volume at the 
bank level only, without geographic breakdown, is reported to the regulatory agencies, and 
information on how the lending is allocated across geographic areas is not in the public domain. 
If we compare two banks’ aggregate lending volumes without observing their respective different 
“local markets,” it is quite possible that the differences we observe are driven by demand-side 
instead of supply-side factors. For example, bank lending in Michigan could be more sensitive to 
monetary policy than in Oklahoma, but it may be explained by the Michigan economy’s more 
pro-cyclical demand for credit. 
In this study, we minimize the concern by restricting the sample to the so-called “county-
banking states,” i.e., to states and years where a bank was not allowed to branch outside its home 
county. In these states, we are confident that loans recorded under a bank or a bank subsidiary are 
made to borrowers most likely located within a certain county, for which we can approximate 
local credit demand. In contrast, after statewide branching is allowed, county-level lending 
volumes become unobservable to researchers, because now the loan volumes reported may 
include operations in multiple counties.  
Based on the historical information on banking regulations compiled by Amel (1993), we 
identify the deregulation year when a state started to allow banks to formally branch across 
county boundaries. Then we identify 18 states and 1,587 counties where, as of the beginning of 
1985, branching deregulations had not taken place and county banking was still practiced. These 
include Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.  
  - 8 -Most of them are located in the central United States, including almost all of the Great 
Lakes, Plains, and Rocky Mountain states. These county-banking states contributed to 32.5% of 
U.S. GDP in 1985. As shown in Table 1, as of the beginning of 1985, none of these county-
banking states allowed branch expansions across county boundaries. During 1985, three states 
deregulated, and then another three followed during 1987. We therefore end the sample in 1986, 
in order to create a relatively balanced panel data set, although many states kept their county-
banking laws intact till as late as 1994 (e.g., Arkansas).  
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
A bank is defined as a “nonlocal bank” if it is a subsidiary of an ultimate bank holding 
company (BHC) that operates in multiple counties; otherwise it is defined as a “local bank.”
5 If 
the parent BHC operates within a single county only, its subsidiaries are considered not different 
from “local banks” and are defined as such. When a BHC controls multiple subsidiaries in the 
same county, we aggregate their lending volumes and attribute the total volume to a same 
“aggregated” nonlocal or local bank. This procedure also helps us avoid the problem of adjusting 
for mergers and acquisitions. If a merger takes place within a county, then the adjustment we use 
is equivalent to that suggested by Peek and Rosengren (1995), in which merged banks are treated 
as a single bank throughout the sample (as if the merger had taken place at the beginning of the 
period). Note that a merger (in the sense that two entities are legally consolidated into one single 
                                                 
5 Limitations certainly exist for such a definition. For example, we do not distinguish between banking 
organizations with a different level of geographic diversification; some holding companies clearly stretch 
farther geographically to more regions than do others, and some holding companies operate in a set of 
regions that exhibit business cycles less synchronized with one another; and their subsidiaries may benefit 
more from such a wider geographic diversification than do those affiliated with a holding company that 
operates only in two neighboring and closely related counties. Nevertheless, in our sample, because of the 
county-banking restriction, the largest distinction that sets one group of banks apart from the other is 
whether a bank belongs to a holding company that operates in multiple counties.  The stand-alone banks 
that operate in only one county are clearly ‘local,’ and comparing them with the rest of the banks is already 
very informative in identifying whether geographic isolation affects bank lending behavior. If anything, our 
definition causes only underestimation of the effect we uncover. 
  - 9 -entity) across county borders was not allowed in the county-banking states. 
Panel A of Table 2 provides summary statistics of the main characteristics of local banks 
versus nonlocal banks (i.e., subsidiaries of multi-county bank holding companies).  
 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
 
2.2. Empirical Model 
The study covers an interesting 10-year period from 1977 to 1986, a full monetary cycle 
that witnessed dramatic swings in policy stance unseen in the relatively calm and moderate 1990s 
but that largely escaped the wave of bank failures in the late 1980s.
 6 The sample period thus can 
be used as an exogenous experiment for us to examine, in a relatively healthy and stable banking 
sector, individual banks’ differential responses to monetary policy.  
The regression models of this study rely heavily on interaction terms to identify the 
effects of bank geographic isolation on the sensitivity of bank lending to monetary shocks. The 
interaction terms help shed light on the research hypotheses by differentiating between local 
banks and nonlocal banks, between monetary tightening and loosening periods, and between 
counties and time periods that inherently experience more or less demand for credit.  
The main regression is specified as follows, where banks are indexed by subscript i, years 
by t, and counties by k.  
                                                 
6 We begin the sample in 1977, partly for data availability reasons. Banking data from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago are available since 1976, but industrial structure data from County Business Patterns 
(CBP) become available from year-end 1977. Note that one year is lost to form the annual difference 
growth-rate series. Note also that the sample period ends before the Fed announced the strength-of-support 
doctrine in 1987, which explicitly required holding-company parents to unconditionally prop up stressed 
subsidiaries. After 1987, even when a bank holding company does not gain extra strength through 
geographic diversification, it has to prop up subsidiaries in trouble, and thus, it becomes more difficult to 
tell whether it is geographic diversification of the holding company or simply the obligation to support that 
provides strength to the subsidiaries. 
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The dependent variable is the real annual growth rate of total loans
7 at bank i in year t, 
calculated by taking the December to December log difference in total loans outstanding and 
adjusting for national consumer price index inflation. We use annual data for the study because 
the Volcker monetary tightening was unusually large and persistent compared with the more 
subtle and temporary innovations usually seen in the relatively calm and moderate 1990s; 
therefore, examining annual changes without going into the quarterly details can already cleanly 
capture the banks’ responses to a certain monetary policy condition. Ashcraft (2006, pp.760) 
explains other technical details on why data on annual changes are preferred to higher frequency 
data. In simple terms, our empirical tests, like Ashcraft’s (2006), heavily rely on interaction terms 
(between the monetary policy measure and certain variables of interest to us); had we use 
quarterly data, we would have had to include in the regressions at least four lags of the monetary 
policy measure and each would have had to be interacted with any one of the variables of interest. 
The regression is estimated using a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) technique, on a 
sample of nearly 70,000 bank-year observations. The standard errors of the coefficients are 
adjusted for clustering of residuals by county × year; i.e., bank-level lending volumes within a 
county in a certain year are not considered to be independent from each other.  
Variable definition and sources are described in Section 2.3 and are also summarized in 
the paper’s Appendix. Below we briefly explain the motivations behind the inclusion of the main 
 
7 To create a consistent time series of loan growth, following Kashyap and Stein (2000), total loan is 
defined as RCFD1400 (Total loans and leases, gross) plus RCFD2165 (Lease financing receivables) prior 
to 1984, and RCFD1400 after. Growth rate (log difference) values greater than 100% or smaller than 100% 
are truncated as outliers, which constitute only 0.72% of the original sample observations. 
  - 11 -explanatory variables. The interaction terms need particular attention. 
  Local Bank (dummy variable): This variable captures whether local banks’ lending 
grows more slowly than nonlocal banks, regardless of monetary policy conditions. 
Morgan and Samolyk (2003), for example, show that geographic isolation reduces banks’ 
ability to make loans (i.e., lowers their loan-to-asset ratios). 
  Local Bank × Monetary Policy Stance: This interaction term between the local bank 
dummy variable and the contemporaneous measure of the monetary stance (averaged 
over a year) helps identify whether local bank lending, compared with that of nonlocal 
banks, is more sensitive to monetary policy, as will be indicated by a positive coefficient 
(note that a lower, negative value for the monetary policy indicator is associated with 
tighter monetary policy). 
  County Manufacturing Share × Money Policy Stance: The fluctuations in loan 
volumes reflect credit demand as well as supply. This interaction term between a 
county’s manufacturing employment share and the national monetary policy stance can 
capture some exogenous fluctuations in a county economy’s demand for bank credit, 
resulting from the prediction of the interest-rate channel and the balance-sheet channel of 
monetary policy transmission that geographic areas with a greater share of manufacturing 
employment are more affected by national monetary policy. (Carlino and DeFina, 1998; 
Peersman and Smets, 2005; Braun and Larrain, 2005, provide evidence on the 
asymmetric impact of a common monetary policy.) The coefficient should carry a 
positive sign if this hypothesis is true.  
  Local Bank × Money Policy Stance × Manufacturing Share: Interpreted together with 
the coefficient on “Local Bank × Money Policy Stance,” the coefficient on this triple 
interaction term can tell us whether the found difference between local and nonlocal 
banks in monetary policy sensitivity also varies across counties with a different level of 
manufacturing employment ratio. The coefficient should carry a negative sign if 
  - 12 -geographic isolation of local banks matters less in the more manufacturing-intensive 
counties, where demand for credit is lower during tightening. 
  (Lagged) Local Bank Market Concentration: Competition among banks may affect 
lending. Boyd, De Nicolò, and Al Jalal (2005) show that bank concentration is inversely 
correlated with loan-to-asset ratio. Adams and Amel (2005) find that the impact of 
monetary policy on loan originations is weaker in more concentrated markets. The lack of 
competition is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of concentration at 
the county market level.
 8 
  (Lagged) Market Share: Banks endowed with a relatively larger initial market share in 
a local market may find it more difficult to expand its customer base further, assuming 
that banks tend to pursue the easier customers first. Thus, in general, they grow more 
slowly because of the increasing marginal cost of acquiring the more difficult customers. 
  State and Year Dummy Variables: To control for state-specific and year-specific 
factors, we include year and state dummy variables in the regressions. The measure of 
monetary policy stance needs to be not directly included in the regression except when 
interacted with other variables, because the year dummy variables already capture any 
year-specific factors, including the general effects of national monetary policy, as well as 
other national economic conditions.  
2.3. Data Sources and Descriptions 
2.3.1. Volcker Monetary Tightening 
  We use the Boschen-Mills narrative index as the main measure of monetary policy stance. 
Boschen and Mills (1995), based on their reading of FOMC directives and related records, 
classify monetary policy conditions into of five categories, according to the changing importance 
                                                 
8 In 1980, the average HHI in the sample is 0.41, which was considered concentrated. Note that local 
markets with an HHI below 0.18 are deemed to be served by enough banks to assume that conditions are 
very competitive. HHIs at the county level remained rather constant over time, which corroborated other 
previous studies, e.g., Dick’s (2006) findings that banking sector consolidations did not usually take place 
within a local market but more in the form of geographic diversifications and expansions. 
  - 13 -that policymakers assigned to controlling inflation versus real growth: −2 (strongly 
contractionary), −1 (mildly contractionary), 0 (Neutral), 1 (mildly expansionary), and 2 (strongly 
expansionary). Exhibit 1 uses this indicator to portray the evolution of the monetary policy stance 
during the 10-year sample period 1977-1986. Note that, in the regressions, we average the 
monthly ratings over a calendar year to measure monetary stance in a certain year.   
 There were large swings in monetary policy during these 10 years, which formed a full 
monetary cycle starting from tightening and ending with gradual easing after inflation was 
successfully tamed.  Starting from late 1979, in particularly after October 1979, the new Fed 
Chairman, Paul Volcker, sharply escalated monetary tightening to combat runaway inflation (see 
Walsh, 2004 and Lindsey, Orphanides, and Rasche, 2005, for a review). He changed the 
operation procedure to target nonborrowed reserves and allowed interest-rate levels to climb at 
some point to over 20 percent. This move was unexpected and a surprise because, at that time, it 
was generally believed to be impossible for the Fed to initiate a highly restrictive monetary policy 
considering the current political and economic environments and expectations.
9 It was highly 
unlikely that some banks foresaw a drastic policy change and made the decision to expand 
geographically well in advance. Over the next two years, monetary policy on the tightening side 
deviated considerably from what a Taylor rule would have prescribed based on the growth and 
inflation forecasts made at that time. (However, in hindsight, based on new information, it was 
found that the output gap was overestimated in the 1970s.) In comparison, during 1985 and 1986 
the monetary stance was widely considered particularly loose (Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 
1994).  
 
[insert Exhibit 1 about here] 
                                                 
9 Prior to the drastic tightening, the Greenbook assessed that a recession had already started by the second 
quarter of 1979 and expected that inflation would soon decelerate. FOMC members were split between the 
hawks and doves; in particular, the discount rate vote on September 18 was split 4 to 3, with Governors 
Partee, Rice, and Teeters dissenting on the dovish side (see Lindsey, Orphanides, and Rasche, 2005, for a 
review of the circumstances surrounding the event). 
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We also use the fed-funds-rate-based Bernanke-Mihov index (as portrayed in Exhibit 2) 
to test the robustness of our results. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) created the index using a flexible 
VAR model based on more specific assumptions about Fed operating procedures, which controls 
for the endogeneity of federal funds rates to economic conditions. Such measures based on fed 
funds rates, however, are considered noisy and not very appropriate for this study’s sample period 
(Kashyap and Stein, 2000),
 10 which mainly coincides with Paul Volcker’s tenure (August 1979 
to August 1987), when fed funds rates were not always the target of open market operations and 
were strongly volatile as a result of the targeting of aggregate supplies of bank reserves. However, 
since the Volcker monetary tightening was unusually drastic, there was not much disagreement 
between the two alternative measures in identifying this very large shock. 
  
[insert Exhibit 2 about here] 
2.3.2 Banking Sector Data 
  The main source for our bank financial data is the Consolidated Reports of Condition & 
Income (known as Call Reports).
11 Observations are excluded for states where and years when 
banks were allowed to branch across county boundaries. As a result of this exclusion rule, loans 
recorded under a bank were most likely made to local residents and businesses located in the 
county where the bank had its headquarters. Although county-banking restrictions effectively 
imposed a ceiling on how large a bank could grow, Panel B of Table 2 shows that the size 
distribution of banks in the county-banking states was quite representative of the national sample. 
                                                 
10 According to Kashyap and Stein (2000), “Both conventional wisdom as well as the formal statistical 
analysis of Bernanke and Mihov (1998) suggests that the funds rate may be particularly inappropriate 
during the high-volatility Volcker period,” because Volcker was mainly targeting bank reserves rather than 
the funds rate in conducting his monetary policy. The Boschen-Mills index is usually considered a better 
indicator of the monetary policy stance during this period.  
11 The data are compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and cover all commercial banks and 
savings banks regulated by the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 
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nonlocal banks was skewed by a small number of very large banks. Below the 90
th percentile, the 
distribution of nonlocal banks was usually only several-fold larger than that of their local bank 
competitors (whereas in Kashyap and Stein [2000] “large banks” were about 100 times larger 
than the “small banks”).  
Note also that those very large banks above the 90
th percentile tended to cluster in a small 
number of metropolitan centers (e.g., Harris County (Houston), as is also documented in Brickley, 
Linck, and Smith (2003); or Cook County (Chicago), where the Continental Illinois Bank was 
headquartered); as a result, in a typical county outside the large urban centers, a nonlocal bank's 
size was usually only twice as large as those of local banks. Later in the regressions we explicitly 
control for holding company size, as well as a bank’s or bank subsidiary's own size, to show that 
our results are not driven by the size difference between local and nonlocal banks.  
Market share of nonlocal banks in a county is also a measure of banking market 
integration. Counties with greater loan market share controlled by holding companies that operate 
across county or even state borders are considered better integrated into the state and the national 
banking markets. Table 3 describes the time-varying bank market integration history in the 
sample, by state and year.  Although nonlocal banks were increasing their market share over time, 
local banks continued to play very significant roles. 
 
[insert Table 3 about here] 
 
2.3.3. County-Level Industrial Structure 
  We obtain industrial structure data from the County Business Pattern database. 
Manufacturing employment share is defined as the share of workers employed in the 
manufacturing sector. In our sample, on average, 23% of workers were employed in the 
manufacturing sector and the share declined gradually over time, consistent with the national 
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with the Great Lakes states recording the highest manufacturing employment share in the nation 
and the Rocky Mountain states the lowest.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Local Banks’ Lending Is More Sensitive to Monetary Tightening 
  In Table 4, regression results are reported on what determines loan volume fluctuations 
across banks during Paul Volcker’s monetary tightening in the early 1980s. Section 2.2 earlier 
explains the regression specifications. Column (1) reports results of a baseline stripped-down 
regression that has not considered variations in local credit demand across counties, while 
Columns (2) and (3) report results that adjust for such variations using interaction terms involving 
information on local industrial structure. More specifically, in Column (2) we use an interaction 
term “County Manufacturing Share × Money Policy Stance” to control for the variations in local 
credit demand across counties. In Column (3), we also add a triple interaction term “Local Bank 
× Money Policy Stance × Manufacturing Share” to take into account the interplay between 
supply-side and demand-side factors. 
 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
 
First of all, the negative coefficient on the local bank dummy indicates that the local 
banks’ lending grows about 1.2% more slowly annually than that of nonlocal banks (i.e., 
subsidiaries of BHCs that operate in multiple counties), averaged over the whole monetary cycle, 
after controlling for their initial local loan market share. (Note that banks with a smaller initial 
share tend to grow faster, other things being equal.)   
However, the growth differential between local and nonlocal banks varies markedly 
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stance” is significantly positive, which suggests that local banks’ lending is more sensitive to 
monetary contraction than that of nonlocal banks. In other words, the growth differential between 
local and nonlocal banks is significantly wider during monetary tightening than during monetary 
loosening.
 12   
The size of the coefficient in Column (2) implies that in a mildly contractionary 
environment (i.e., Boschen-Mills index = −1) a local bank’s lending grows more slowly by on 
average of 2.1% (=1.20+0.92) annually than lending in a similar nonlocal bank, other things 
being equal (e.g., initial market share, local credit demand). In a mildly expansionary 
environment (i.e., Boschen-Mills Index = 1), in contrast, the differential can be as small as only 
0.3% (= 1.20−0.92). At the peak of Volcker tightening, which is marked by a Boschen-Mills 
index value of −2, a 3.0% difference (= 1.20+0.92*2) in loan growth rates can be attributed to 
local bank status. Note that the median real loan growth rate during our sample period is merely 
0.76% for nonlocal banks and 0.11% for local banks. This cyclical pattern in cross-sectional 
variations is consistent with Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi’s (2005) and Craig and Haubrich’s (2006) 
findings that the heterogeneity in loan growth and the reallocation of credit across banks is more 
intensive under unfavorable economic conditions.  
In Column (2), the coefficient on “Manufacturing share × Monetary policy stance” is 
significantly positive, which confirms that loan volumes in counties with a higher share of 
manufacturing employment are indeed more sensitive to a change in monetary policy. This result 
is consistent with theories on the interest-rate and the balance-sheet channel of monetary policy 
transmission and confirms our previous assumption that the interaction term between the local 
share of manufacturing employment and the national monetary policy stance can well capture the 
exogenous component of a county’s demand for loans. A back-of-the-envelope calculation based 
                                                 
12 Note that Ashcraft (2003) finds that the benefits of holding-company affiliation appeared only after the 
formal announcement of the Federal Reserve’s source-of-strength doctrine in February 1987. Our results 
suggest that the effects had been present since a much earlier time. 
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mildly contractionary, bank loan growth slows down, on average, by 3.3 percentage points in a 
county with high manufacturing employment, compared with only 1.4 percentage points in a 
county with low manufacturing employment. The results clearly confirm that monetary tightening 
has more negative consequences for counties with high manufacturing employment. Note that all 
types of loans are affected in an industrial town during a monetary tightening. Manufacturing 
activities have a direct impact on demand for commercial and industrial loans, and a decline in 
manufacturing activities also affects demand for real estate and consumer loans through slower 
local income growth and a higher unemployment rate, which compromises the creditworthiness 
and collateral values of local borrowers.  
In Column (3), results are reported for a regression that includes a triple interaction term 
“Local bank × Money Stance × Manufacturing Share.” The coefficients are found to be 
significantly negative, which suggests that the gap between local and nonlocal banks is less 
pronounced when a county employs more people in manufacturing. The size of the coefficient 
suggests that in a mildly contractionary environment (Boschen-Mills index = −1), in a county 
with 14.7% of workers in manufacturing (the 25
th percentile county, representative of Great 
Plains states such as Arizona or Oklahoma), a local bank’s lending grows 2.5% more slowly than 
that of a nonlocal bank, other things being equal, whereas in a county with 33.8% of workers in 
manufacturing (the 75
th percentile county, representative of Great Lakes states such as Michigan), 
a local bank grows only 1.8% more slowly, not very different from their normal speed. The 
regression results indicate that when manufacturing employment share exceeds 23% in a county, 
the difference in lending pro-cyclicality between local banks and nonlocal banks becomes 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Such counties account for about half of the sample. 
Such a differential effect across counties of high and low shares of manufacturing 
employment can be explained by the difference in local credit demand. In manufacturing-
intensive counties, during monetary tightening, the demand for industrial loans decreases directly 
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loans declines because of the associated lower employment and income growth that compromises 
local borrowers’ creditworthiness and the value of their collateral. As a result of weaker loan 
demand in these industrial towns, the supply-side constraints of local banks are less likely to be 
binding. The results are also suggestive evidence on the opportunities for bank holding companies 
to reallocate liquidity from low loan-demand counties to high loan-demand counties or, more 
precisely, from relatively more manufacturing-intensive counties to more service-intensive 
counties during monetary contractions, and in the opposite direction during monetary expansions. 
On the other hand, the relatively stable loan volume of local banks in manufacturing-intensive 
counties can be explained by their lack of outside lending opportunities when the local demand 
for loans is low (e.g., in manufacturing-intensive counties during periods of tight money).  
Our results on the difference between local and nonlocal banks cannot be considered 
robust before controlling for their size differences. Local banks are not always smaller than the 
local subsidiaries of multiple-county bank holding companies: in county-banking states, bank 
sizes for both local and nonlocal banks are capped by the size of the host county’s economy (i.e., 
no banks are allowed to branch outside their home counties). However, if we consider a holding 
company as a well-coordinated entity and consider that the local banks are competing against the 
holding companies instead of the individual subsidiaries, then local bank status seems to be 
associated with smaller size. To control for the difference in bank size, we use three alternative 
measures. The first one measures an individual bank’s or subsidiary’s own size; the second one 
considers the size of a holding company as the real “size” of its local subsidiaries; the last 
measure uses market share (i.e., relative size) to take into account size differences in local 
economies across counties and the special regulatory restrictions that link the potential size of 
banks to local market size. Values for the first two measures are converted to 1993 constant U.S. 
dollars, and all three measures are lagged by one year when included in the regressions.   
The results based on the three alternative measures are reported in Columns (4), (5), and 
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means stronger sensitivity to monetary policy. Further, we find that, other things being equal, 
holding company size has no significant effect on a subsidiary’s response to monetary policy; 
(somewhat surprisingly) the own size of a bank or bank subsidiary has a positive effect on the 
sensitivity; and larger market share is associated with a weaker  response to monetary policy. The 
results seem to favor the explanation that a dominant bank (measured by relative size) in a 
concentrated local market, regardless of its absolute size, is more willing to maintain stable 
lending in bad times, expecting that it can recoup the rents in good times through more secured 
banking relationship, against the alternative explanation that larger banking organizations can 
prop up lending because of better access to wholesale funding. Indeed, in the summary statistics 
presented in Table 2, we also notice that nonlocal banks are as dependent on deposit funding (vs. 
wholesale funding) as the local banks.   
In Column (7), we use the Bernanke-Mihov measure to replace the Boschen-Mills 
measure of monetary policy stance and re-estimate the regression, to test for the robustness of the 
results. We inflate the Bernanke-Mihov index by a factor of 20 to make it roughly comparable in 
scale with the Boschen-Mills index. The rank correlation coefficient between the Bernanke-
Mihov index and the Boschen-Mills index during the sample period is 0.79. Not surprisingly, the 
main empirical results discussed above remain robust to this alternative measure of the monetary 
policy stance. 
 
3.2. Robustness Tests: Controlling for Other Factors 
We conduct additional tests to examine the robustness of our findings by looking into a 
bank’s liquidity and capital conditions, as well as the subsidiary’s size distribution within the 
bank holding companies. The regression results are reported in Table 5 and discussed below. 
 
[insert Table 5 about here] 
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3.2.1. Controlling for Liquidity and Capital Conditions 
The lending view of monetary policy transmission believes that a central bank influences 
commercial banks’ lending by controlling the liquidity available to them. This mechanism 
characterizes our sample period very well, because Volcker targeted nonborrowed bank reserves 
instead of the fed funds rate. Facing monetary tightening and outflow of insured deposits, banks 
need either to cut back on loans or to draw down on their liquid assets, but doing the latter can 
create liquidity risks. Empirical research in general shows that banks pursue a counter-cyclical 
liquidity policy to hedge risks (e.g., Aspachs, Nier, and Tiesset, 2005). Kashyap and Stein (2000) 
find that less liquid banks are more sensitive to monetary shocks and that such a relationship is 
stronger among smaller banks. If local and nonlocal banks differ in their liquidity condition, then 
their differential responses to monetary shocks might be driven by this difference, as opposed to 
their local or nonlocal bank status.   
To control for this, in Column (1) we include an interaction term between a bank’s liquid 
asset ratio (lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity) and the contemporaneous measure of the 
monetary policy stance. Liquid assets include fed funds sold, securities purchased under 
agreements to resell, securities held to maturity, and trading assets.
  13 Further, since Van den 
Heuvel’s (2001) theory suggests that less capitalized banks may be more sensitive to money 
tightening,  in Column (2) we also examine the effect of bank capital condition as measured by 
the capital-to-asset ratio
14. 
Like Kashyap and Stein (2000), we find that more liquid banks are less affected by the 
                                                 
13 Following Kashyap and Stein (2000), the measure of a bank’s liquidity is computed as RCFD0400 + 
RCFD0600 + RCFD0900+RCFD0380+ RCFD1350, prior to 1984. Between 1984 and 1992, it is computed 
as RCFD0390 + RCFD1350+ RCFD2146. Cash in vaults is not counted as liquidity because a greater 
portion of it is stored for purposes of reserve requirements. The balance-sheet liquidity ratio is defined as 
the ratio of liquidity to total assets. 
14 During the sample period, the Federal Reserve set minimum capital requirements based on a primary 
capital-to-total-asset ratio of about 6% (Keeley, 1988). Risk-weighted capital requirements were enacted 
much later following the 1988 Basel Accord. 
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previous results on local vs. nonlocal banks remain robust: the coefficient on “Local bank × 
Monetary policy stance” remains significantly positive, and the size of the coefficient only gets 
larger (partly because local banks are typically associated with higher liquidity ratios and higher 
capital-to-asset ratios).   
We also control for a bank’s liquidity management potential due to financial market 
innovations.
15 Loutskina (2005) shows that banks with more single-family home mortgages in 
their loan portfolios can better withstand monetary shocks, because it is easier to securitize home 
mortgages as a result of the liquid market created by federal agencies. In 1980, about 10% of 
single-family home mortgage loans were securitized, whereas in 1985 the ratio reached nearly 
25%. During the same period, less than 5% of multifamily residential mortgage loans were 
securitized. A bank with more home mortgages on its balance sheet, therefore, is effectively more 
liquid (Estrella, 2002).  
In Column (3), results are reported for a regression that includes an interaction term 
between the monetary policy stance and the ratio of home mortgages in a bank’s loan portfolio 
(lagged by one year). The results, however, show that lending by banks with a higher home 
mortgage ratio is actually more sensitive to monetary policy (although the result is not 
statistically significant), probably because the cyclical demand for home mortgages dominates the 
supply-side factor. More important, our previous results still hold: local banks are significantly 
more sensitive to monetary policy. 
3.2.2. Can Holding Companies Help Their Subsidiaries Live with a Lower Liquidity Ratio? 
We suspect that a multi-county bank holding company may be able to use liquid assets 
                                                 
15 The previous literature also suggests other risk management techniques that can help shield bank lending 
from monetary shocks. Purnanandam (2007) shows that banks using more interest-rate derivatives for 
hedging purposes respond less to interest-rate shocks. The data he uses are not available prior to 1985. 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) show that banks engaging in loan purchases and sales activities can better 
withstand monetary shocks; the data, however, are available only between 1987 and 1993. 
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16 
A bank may need to reduce lending volume when experiencing deposit outflows, but a bank can 
address the situation by rebalancing its asset portfolio, e.g., selling off its liquid asset holdings 
and avoiding cutting loan volume (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). Banks typically have more 
active control on their asset portfolio composition than on the deposit supply, which is influenced 
more exogenously by the interest rate and local market conditions. In unreported results we do 
not find any statistically significant difference between local and nonlocal banks in their ability to 
retain deposits after a monetary contraction. Therefore, the more likely explanation for the 
difference between local and nonlocal banks in loan volume fluctuations might be found in a 
bank’s liquid asset ratio, i.e., in how a bank allocates its assets between liquid assets and loans.  
  Banks hold about a third of their total assets in liquid securities. In our sample,  local 
banks, on average, hold more liquid assets than nonlocal banks, regardless of monetary policy 
stance, consistent with Demsetz and Strahan’s (1997) finding that smaller banks take fewer risks. 
We focus instead on the change in the level of the liquidity ratio and examine whether the gap 
between local and nonlocal banks grows wider when monetary policy is tightened. In Column (4), 
we use the annual percentage point change of a bank’s liquidity ratio as the dependent variable, to 
study the determinants of the fluctuations of a bank’s liquidity position. 
The results show that, during monetary tightening, local banks build up their liquidity 
buffers significantly more than do nonlocal banks, as evidenced by the significantly negative 
coefficient on the interaction term “Local Bank × Money.” The results suggest that subsidiaries of 
a multi-county holding company can afford to lower their liquidity ratio during monetary 
                                                 
16 Ehrmann and Worms (2004) argue that the existence of bank networks is important for banks' reactions 
to monetary policy. Based on German data, they find that small banks access the interbank market 
indirectly through the large head institutions of their respective network organizations. The interbank flows 
within these networks allow smaller banks to manage their funds in a fashion that helps them keep their 
loan portfolios with nonbanks relatively unaffected after a monetary contraction. Also, Carletti, Hartmann, 
and Spagnolo’s (2007) theory shows that this diversification effect is stronger when the relative cost of 
refinancing is high, which should suggest that local banks need to hold more liquid assets, particularly 
during monetary tightening.  
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fellow subsidiaries located in other geographic areas (and liquidity shocks are not perfectly 
correlated across geographic regions), whereas local banks have to hoard securities and other 
liquid assets to prepare for such situations; inevitably, they would have to cut back on loans to 
achieve this.  
3.2.3. Does a Subsidiary’s Share in the Holding Company Matter? 
  Within a bank holding company, the lead subsidiary that accounts for 70% of the group’s 
total assets should not expect support from a small subsidiary that accounts for only 5% of the 
group’s assets as much as the other way around. We revise the definition of a “Nonlocal Bank” to 
take this into account: now a lead subsidiary that accounts for more than 50% of the holding 
company’s total assets is considered a “Local Bank,” because this lead subsidiary is less likely to 
receive substantial support from other smaller subsidiaries and should behave in a way similar to 
a stand-alone local bank (of similar size). This new definition reclassifies about 17% of 
previously “nonlocal banks” into the “local bank” category, and what remains as “nonlocal 
banks” under the new definition are those smaller subsidiaries that are not the dominant lead 
banks of their holding companies. The new definition is more comparable to Campello’s (2002), 
in which only smaller subsidiaries are included in the comparison. Column (5) reports regression 
results based on this new definition. Our previous results still hold, and the size of the effects is 
stronger: the smaller subsidiaries, as predicted, indeed benefit disproportionately more than the 
larger lead subsidiaries.  
  We also consider the possibility that those tiny community banks, by their large numbers, 
are driving the regression results. If the growth differential between nonlocal banks and local 
banks exists mainly in the much smaller size group, the effect on aggregate lending could be 
much smaller than the coefficients appear to indicate. In Column (6), we thus estimate the 
regression based only on larger banks (both local and nonlocal banks) that control more than 10% 
of a county’s loan market. Only half of the banks or bank subsidiaries in the sample exceed this 
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substantial size (controlling >10% of local market share) respond more strongly to monetary 
shocks than do nonlocal banks of similar size.  
    
4. Discussions 
Our study is closely related to the literature that attempts to identify the bank lending 
channel of monetary policy transmission by studying the heterogeneous response to monetary 
policy by individual banks that differ in liquidity condition (e.g. Kashyap and Stein (2000)), the 
use of interest rate swaps or loan sales to manage risks (e.g., Purnanandam (2007), Cebenoyan 
and Strahan (2004)), and holding company affiliation (Campello (2002) and Ashcraft (2003)).  
This study’s innovation is mainly empirical. It exploits a special regulatory setting to pin 
down a bank’s borrower base to a very narrow local geographic unit — a county — and  then to 
allow proper control of variations in local credit demand using the prediction of the interest-rate 
channel and the balance-sheet channel of monetary policy transmission that manufacturing-
intensive industrial towns are more affected by a national monetary tightening independent from 
banking sector conditions. 
This study draws evidence from 18 U.S. county-banking states over a 10-year period 
(1977-1986) and shows that (a) other things being equal, local banks’ loan supply exhibits 
stronger sensitivity to monetary policy, compared with that of nonlocal banks (i.e., local 
subsidiaries of multi-county bank holding companies), and (b) the difference is smaller in 
counties where the share of manufacturing employment is larger, because weak loan demand in 
these counties during recessions tend to make loan supply weakness less relevant.  
As Cecchetti (1995) notes (in discussing the bank lending and balance-sheet channels of 
monetary policy transmission), “With the introduction of interstate banking and the development 
of more sophisticated pools of loans, it is only the balance sheet effects that will remain.” The 
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increasing consolidation and small local banks’ declining market share since the 1980s, bank 
loans would have been much more sensitive to monetary policy and the bank lending channel of 
monetary policy would have been much more effective, particularly considering the increasing 
share of nonmanufacturing employment in the U.S. economy, which has raised the importance of 
credit supply during monetary tightening.  
Banks’ geographic diversification may reduce the efficacy of monetary policy 
operations,
17 but it also buffers the banking system against many other unfavorable shocks, in 
particular those isolated shocks specific to certain regions only. Calomiris (1993), comparing the 
historical experiences of the U.S. and Canada, suggests that the banking market fragmentation in 
the U.S. in the early part of the 20th century destabilized the banking system by creating small, 
poorly diversified banks that were vulnerable to bank runs and portfolio shocks. One of the 
comparative advantages of financial institutions versus market finance is their ability to provide 
intertemporal smoothing (Allen and Gale, 1997). Larrain (2006) shows that a developed banking 
sector helps smooth out industrial volatility by conducting counter-cyclical lending. Many factors 
(e.g., a bank's funding structure) can determine whether a bank is able to avoid pro-cyclicality in 
lending and to insulate its borrowers against negative shocks.
18 The results of this paper may 
suggest that the declining share of local banks in the U.S. banking sector could have contributed 
to the stabilization of the financial sector and may help central bankers better focus on price 
stability when making monetary policy. 
                                                 
17 Empirical studies have shown that in recent periods, the correlation between changes in the fed funds rate 
and subsequent quarters’ real GDP growth has reached near zero (Kuttner and Mosser, 2002; Estrella 2002; 
Boivin and Giannoni 2002; Taylor 1995), leading to the notion that monetary policy has become less 
effective. There have been many explanations. The results of this study provide one new potential 
explanation for the trend: that the declining share of geographically isolated local banks may have 
contributed to it. 
18 Berlin and Mester (1999) show that access to core deposits with inelastic rates permits a bank to make 
contractual agreements with borrowers that are infeasible if the bank must pay market rates for funds, and 
such access insulates a bank’s costs of funds from exogenous shocks, allowing it to insulate its borrowers 
against exogenous credit shocks. Gatev and Strahan (2006) and Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2006) 
both show that transactions deposits help banks hedge liquidity risk from unused loan commitments and 
that, as a result, users of credit lines could consider banks with better access to core deposit more reliable. 
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  - 32 -Exhibit 1: Boschen-Mills (1995) index of monetary policy stance 
Boschen and Mills (1995), based on their reading of FOMC documents, rate Fed policy as being in one of 
the following five categories: -2 (strongly contractionary), -1 (mildly contractionary), 0 (Neutral), 1 (mildly 
expansionary), and 2 (strongly expansionary). Exhibit 1 uses this measure to portray the evolution of the 















































































Exhibit 2: Bernanke-Mihov (1998) index of monetary policy stance 
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) create the index based on a flexible VAR model that nests similar models in 
the previous literature, but based on more specific assumptions about Fed operating procedures. This index 
thus controls for the endogeneity of federal fund rates to economic conditions. More positive (negative) 
values indicate a loose (tighter) monetary policy stance. In the regressions, we inflate the index by a factor 












































































  - 33 -Tables 1:  Timeline of branching deregulations 
This table documents the timeline of branching deregulations in the county-banking states. The second 
column, “deregulation date,” indicates the date when a state first legalized bank branching across county 
boundaries, prior to which “county banking” was practiced. As of the beginning of 1985, none of the 18 
states in our sample had allowed branching across county boundaries. The third column briefly summarizes 
the changes initiated by the deregulations. See Amel (1993) for details. The fourth column, “MBHC date,” 
indicates the date when formation of multi-bank holding companies (MBHC) was first legalized in a state. 
N/A indicates that MBHCs have always been legal. The fifth column briefly summarizes the changes of 






Changes of branching 
restrictions 
MBHC 
date  Changes of restrictions 
Arkansas  01/01/94  (06/28/85) may take over out-of-
county failed banks Æ Allowed 
into contiguous counties 
02/05/71 Grandfathered  BHCs 
Colorado 08/01/91 Within  3,000  feet  ÆStatewide by 
merger 
N/A No  limitations 
Illinois 09/01/88  ÆContiguous counties  01/01/82  Prohibited Æ Home and 
contiguous regions 
Indiana 07/01/89  CountywideÆ Allowed into 
contiguous counties 
07/01/85 ProhibitedÆBHC (10% 
cap) 
Iowa ?/?/2001    N/A  8%  cap 
Kansas 04/30/87  ÆStatewide by merger  07/01/85  Prohibited Æ BHC (9% 
cap) 
Kentucky 07/13/90  ÆStatewide by merger  07/14/84  ProhibitedÆ3 banks in 
five years 
Michigan 03/01/87  ÆStatewide by merger  04/??/71  ProhibitedÆNo 
limitations 
Minnesota 08/01/87  ÆAllowed in seven-county 
Minneapolis-St. Paul area 
N/A No  limitations 
Montana 01/01/90 ÆStatewide by merger, or de novo 
in adjoining county 
N/A No  limitations 
Nebraska  03/04/85  (03/31/83) can take over failed 




North Dakota  07/05/87  ÆStatewide by merger  N/A  No limitations 
Oklahoma 03/16/88  ÆStatewide by merger  10/10/83  11% cap 
Oregon  03/12/85  Restricted for city of less than 
50,000 population in which 
another bank is located Æ 
statewide 
N/A No  limitations 
Tennessee 04/19/85  CountywideÆ Previously 
operated as an affiliate of a BHC 
Æ Statewide (03/08/90) 
N/A UnlimitedÆ (03/03/74) 
five years old or same 
county, 16.5% capÆ 
(04/18/85) five-year limit 
waived if in a county of 
>200,000 residents 
Texas 10/26/88  CountywideÆ Statewide  08/18/70  Prohibited Æ No 
limitations 
Wisconsin 08/01/89  25milesÆStatewide N/A  No  limitations 
Wyoming  04/09/88  May take over failed banksÆ 
Statewide by merger 
N/A No  limitations 
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Panel A: Bank characteristics (Nonlocal vs. Local Banks) 
 Median  Mean 
 Local  Nonlocal  Local  Nonlocal 
Total Assets (000’)  36,961  91,256  74,530  508,858 
Total Loan (000’)  19,223  52,194  40,318  292,772 
County Market Share  0.096  0.195  0.173  0.235 
Real Loan Growth Rate (%)  0.109  0.762  0.928  2.049 
Loan to Asset Ratio  0.539  0.576  0.527  0.568 
Deposit to Asset Ratio  0.896  0.892  0.884  0.873 
Capital to Asset Ratio  0.082  0.072  0.087  0.075 
C&I Loan Ratio  0.185  0.261  0.213  0.278 
Real Estate Loan Ratio  0.309  0.345  0.324  0.357 
Home Mortgage Ratio  0.157  0.170  0.189  0.198 
Liquidity Ratio  0.352  0.287  0.363  0.297 
Fed Funds Purch. Ratio  0.000  0.003  0.009  0.026 
Fed Funds Sold Ratio  0.046  0.042  0.061  0.061 
Lending Rate (%)  11.89  11.91  11.68  11.89 
Deposit Rate (%)  6.24  6.29  6.05  6.25 
Net Interest Margin (%)  5.48  5.48  5.65  5.64 
 
Panel B: Distribution of bank size (total loan in thousands of 1993 constant USD) 
Note:  “National sample” includes banks chartered in any U.S. states, while the statistics on local and 
nonlocal banks are based on banks from the county-banking states only.  The Kashyap and Stein (2000) 
study examines the national sample of banks. 
Year 1978    Year 1985  Size 
distribution 
percentile  Nonlocal Local National 
Sample   Nonlocal  Local  National 
Sample 
1%  4,605 1,775  2,165    3,975 1,761  1,974 
5%  13,530 4,127  4,885    8,027 3,937  4,520 
10%  17,808 5,897  7,227    11,833 5,647  6,746 
25% 34,261  10,640 13,417    21,777  9,934  12,654 
50%  67,311 21,552  28,355    47,352 19,068  26,947 
75%  163,148 42,734  62,077    112,997 37,326  62,527 
90%  428,143 85,091  161,102    313,848 70,704 176,463 
95% 1,262,502 132,399  332,421    697,836 107,225  438,528 
99% 6,027,880 387,841 1,821,513    5,080,295 297,450  2,615,301 
No.  Obs.  644 7,550  13,955    1,385 5,633 12,642 
  - 35 -Table 3: Time-varying banking market integration 
The table documents the evolution of banking market integration over time in county-banking states as 
bank holding companies acquired more and more out-of-county assets. Ratios in the table are loan market 
shares of nonlocal banks in state i in year t. The discrete changes of the ratio in Illinois during 1980 and 
1981 were caused by the temporary entry into and exit from local bank status of the two largest banks in 
the state: Continental Illinois Bank (local during 80 and 81), and First Chicago Corp (local during 81). N/A 
indicates that in state i and year t banks were allowed to branch across county borders and the bank market 
integration measure we use was not applicable. 
 
State  1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Arkansas    0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.33 0.36 0.43 
Colorado    0.67 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.74 
Illinois    0.03 0.53 0.57 0.27 0.07 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.66 
Indiana    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.30 0.62 
Iowa    0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.44 
Kansas    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.20 
Kentucky    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.30 0.52 0.62 
Michigan  0.65 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.84 0.85 0.87 
Minnesota    0.57 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.71 
Montana    0.56 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.69 
Nebraska    0.09 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.30 0.36 N/A N/A 
North  Dakota    0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.41 
Oklahoma    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.26 0.29 0.34 
Oregon    0.32 0.34 0.37 0.68 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.72 N/A N/A 
Tennessee    0.43 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.56 0.41 N/A N/A 
Texas    0.51 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.65 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.73 
Wisconsin    0.44 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.55 0.60 0.62 0.68 
Wyoming    0.44 0.43 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.62 0.63 0.64 
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Note: The dependent variable is the real annual growth rate of loans (%) at the bank level. “Local” is the 
dummy variable for local banks; “Money” is the Boschen-Mills monetary policy stance index, except in 
Column (7) in which the Bernanke-Mihov index is used; for both indices, lower, negative values indicate 
tighter monetary policy;  “Manufacture” is a county’s manufacturing employment share; three measures 
of “Size” are used: one measures a bank or subsidiary’s own size, another uses holding-company size as 
the size of its subsidiary; yet another uses local market share (i.e., relative size). “HHI” is the Herfindahl 
index measure of county-level market concentration; “Market share” is a bank’s loan market share in a 
county. The symbol “×” indicates interaction between two variables. Year and U.S. state dummy variables 
are included, but their coefficients are not reported for the sake of brevity. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering of residuals by county×year. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. More details on the 
regression specification definitions and data sources of the variables can be found in Section 2 of the paper. 
 
         




















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
Local Bank  -1.20*** -1.20*** -1.23*** -1.21*** -1.24*** -1.30*** -1.57*** 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) 
         
Local × Money  0.93*** 0.92*** 1.82*** 2.32*** 2.34*** 1.67*** 1.63*** 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.44) (0.47) (0.60) (0.44) (0.40) 
         
    -3.70*** -3.84*** -3.80*** -3.66**  -6.12*** 
    (1.42) (1.42) (1.42) (1.42) (1.37) 
Local ×  Money 
×  Manufacturet-1
       
Size × Money     0.40***  0.12  -2.20***   
     (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.57)   
         
Manufacturet-1   1.71** 1.59** 1.47** 1.56** 1.38***  -1.12** 
    (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.57) 
         
  5.34*** 4.92*** 4.44*** 4.78*** 4.50**  3.21*** 
  (0.64) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.66) (0.49) 
Manufacturet-1 ×  
Money 
       
HHIt-1 7.03*** 6.69*** 6.71*** 5.96*** 6.49*** 6.78*** 6.72*** 
  (0.77) (0.78) (0.78) (0.82) (0.81) (0.78) (0.78) 
         
Market Sharet-1 -11.81*** -11.89*** -11.90*** -11.18*** -11.69*** -12.93*** -11.90*** 
  (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.58) (0.58) (0.67) (0.56) 
         
Observations  68896 68678 68678 68678 68678 68678 68678 
Adj.  R-squared  0.144 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.145 
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Note: The dependent variable is the real annual growth rate of loans (%) at the bank level, except in 
Column (4) in which annual percentage-point change in the liquidity ratio is the dependent variable. 
“Local” is the dummy variable for local banks; “Money” is the monetary policy stance index; 
“Manufacture” is a county’s manufacturing employment share; “Liquidity” is the liquid asset ratio of a 
bank; “Capital” is the capital to asset ratio; “Mortgage” is the home mortgage loan to total loan ratio; 
“HHI” is the Herfindahl index measure of county-level market concentration; “Market share” is a bank’s 
loan market share in a county. The symbol “×” indicates interaction between two variables. Column (5) 
counts as “local banks” those lead subsidiaries that account for more than 50% of a holding company’s 
total loans. Column (6) excludes from the regression small banks that supply less than 10% of their relevant 
local county loan market. Year and U.S. state dummy variables are included, but their coefficients are not 
reported for the sake of brevity. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustering of residuals by county×year. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  More details on the regression specification definitions and data 
sources of the variables can be found in Section 2 of this paper. 
 
            
 Control  for  Size  distribution 














 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
Local Bank  -1.20*** -1.17*** -1.23*** 0.14  -0.73***  -0.15 
 (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.09)  (0.25)  (0.23) 
            
Local × Money  2.07*** 2.33*** 1.83*** -1.01***  2.13***  1.56*** 
 (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.19)  (0.47)  (0.41) 
            
-3.84*** -3.78*** -3.70*** 0.71  -3.58**  -3.11** 
(1.42) (1.40) (1.42) (0.60)  (1.52)  (1.27) 
Local ×  Money 
×  Manufacturet-1
        
-3.55***           Liquidity × 
Money  (0.76)          
          
Capital × Money   -43.85***        
   (5.88)         
  0.54        Mortgage × 
Money    (0.72)       
            
Manufacturet-1 1.61** 1.37** 1.54** 0.47* 1.63**  2.25*** 
 (0.70)  (0.70)  (0.70)  (0.27)  (0.70)  (0.68) 
            
4.79*** 4.32*** 4.78*** 0.29  5.01***  5.10*** 
(0.65) (0.64) (0.67) (0.27)  (0.65)  (0.63) 
Manufacturet-1 ×  
Money 
        
HHIt-1 6.48*** 5.64*** 6.72*** -1.56***  6.45***  6.70*** 
 (0.78)  (0.78)  (0.78)  (0.31)  (0.78)  (0.74) 
            
Market Sharet-1 -11.70*** -11.02*** -11.91*** 2.19***  -11.66***  -7.72*** 
 (0.56)  (0.55)  (0.56)  (0.22)  (0.55)  (0.59) 
            
Observations 68678  68678  68678  68678  68678  35099 
Adj. R-squared  0.146  0.151  0.146  0.066  0.145  0.171 
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Variable Definition  Data  Source 
Total loan  Following Kashyap and Stein (2000) total loan is 
defined as RCFD1400 (Total loans and leases, gross) 
plus RCFD2165 (Lease financing receivables) prior to 
1984, and RCFD1400 thereafter.  
 
Call Report 
Real loan growth 
(%) 
Natural log difference of total loan between year t and 
year t-1, adjusted for consumer price inflation; in 
percentage term. Values greater than 100% or smaller 
than -100% are truncated as outliers, which constitute 
only 0.72% of the original sample observations. 
 
Call Report 
Local bank dummy  Dummy variable for local banks, which are NOT 
affiliated with any bank-holding companies that own 
subsidiaries in multiple counties 
 
Call Report 
Money  Measure of monetary policy stance; a positive, higher 
(negative, lower) value indicates a more expansionary 






ΔLiquidity ratio  Following Kashyap and Stein (2000), the measure of a 
bank’s liquidity is computed as RCFD0400 + 
RCFD0600 + RCFD0900+RCFD0380 + RCFD1350, 
prior to 1984. Between 1984 and 1992, it is computed 
as RCFD0390 + RCFD1350+ RCFD2146. The 
balance-sheet liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio of 
liquidity to total assets.  
The change of liquidity ratio is defined as the liquidity 
ratio (%) at year t minus the liquidity ratio (%) at year 
t-1.   
 
Call Report 
Capital  Equity to total asset ratio 
 
Call Report 
Manufacture  Manufacturing employment to total employment ratio, 




Market share  Loan market share of a bank in a county 
 
Call Report 
HHI  Herfindahl measure of market concentration at the 
county market level 
 
Call Report 
Home mortgage  Home mortgage loan to total loan ratio  Call Report 
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